Safe Harbor Faces Nasdaq Exit Despite Growing Business. CEO Explains the Disconnect
Safe Harbor Financial (NASDAQ: SHFS) faces a scheduled suspension from Nasdaq trading on November 18 after a dramatic increase in outstanding shares and a prolonged decline in its stock price. Yet the company’s cannabis banking operations are reporting higher revenue, growing loan program income and the strongest deposit activity in more than two years.
For CEO Terrance “Terry” Mendez, those developments illustrate a disconnect between the underlying business’s performance and the financial pressures facing its publicly traded parent company.
“First, remember there’s the public company, and then there’s the real operations of the business. And those things are today misaligned,” Mendez told IgniteIt in an exclusive interview.
“The operations of the business continue to be strong and getting stronger. If you ask me for my state of the union, I would say Safe Harbor is strong.”
His assessment comes at a consequential moment for the company, which is exploring restructuring alternatives while preparing for the possibility that its shares will move to an over-the-counter market.
A Growing Business Behind a Struggling Stock
Safe Harbor’s third-quarter results offer evidence of the distinction Mendez describes.
Revenue increased 6.5% year over year to approximately $1.95 million, while loan program income rose 70.2% to roughly $869,000, primarily reflecting improved revenue-sharing terms rather than a comparable increase in loan volume.
Average client deposits reached $112 million, and the trailing 14-day average at quarter-end climbed to approximately $119 million, its highest level since April 2024.
Mendez attributes the deposit growth to the activity of existing cannabis customers and the addition of new accounts.

“Cannabis participants, both our current client base plus new clients that we’ve added, are growing, and so we’re benefiting from their growth, and we’re seeing record numbers,” he said.
The company is also developing lending products for businesses that have historically struggled to obtain financing.
“Now we’re seeing some success on the lending side as we open things like small business loans for starting up dispensaries, which most companies can’t do,” Mendez explained.
“Most banks won’t lend to a small business. At the same time, there’s no SBA lending. So we have this capability that we’ve been able to build, and people are coming to us.”
The growth does not eliminate Safe Harbor’s financial difficulties. The company continues to face operating losses and substantial capital-structure challenges.
But Mendez argues that the services provided to financial institutions and cannabis operators retain value independently of the stock’s performance.
Why Banks Still Need Safe Harbor
Safe Harbor has repositioned itself from a cannabis-focused financial technology provider into a broader services business supporting banks, credit unions and cannabis operators.
“We’re going to be the compliance arm of financial institutions wishing to serve the cannabis industry,” Mendez explained.
But compliance is only one part of the strategy.
“We’re going to expand our lending capability so that we can lend through private equity and lend through family offices, which we’ve done. And we’re going to extend our ability to service the clients of our customers.”
Those additional services include human resources, information technology and financial accounting.
The business model is designed to help financial institutions enter or expand within cannabis banking without building an entirely new compliance and customer-acquisition infrastructure.
Mendez estimates that establishing an independent cannabis banking program can cost a regional bank or credit union between $500,000 and $1 million before acquiring its first customer.
“There’s no way that I would spend half a million to a million dollars building a cannabis-friendly banking program when I can rent one from Safe Harbor,” he said, describing the appeal of using an established service provider rather than developing those capabilities internally.
He described a model in which financial institutions pay Safe Harbor when the partnership generates business.
“Even if you don’t get a customer, you don’t pay Safe Harbor. If you get a customer and we’re actually doing something for you and your customer, your depositor, then there’s a fee.”
The company also helps smaller financial institutions arrange loans that exceed their individual lending limits.
Mendez offered the example of a credit union limited to $2 million loans whose established cannabis customer needs $6 million.
“Why don’t we get you the six million bucks, but we’re going to do it with a combination of private equity, do it with a combination of other banks and maybe family offices,” he explained.
“Get the $6 million done. Syndicate or participate this out so that you don’t lose your client.”
Safe Harbor can also assist lenders when cannabis borrowers enter receivership, helping protect collateral and manage assets.
For Mendez, these are services that remain necessary regardless of what happens to the company’s stock.
How the Financing That Saved Safe Harbor Led to Massive Dilution
The difficulties facing Safe Harbor’s shareholders have their origins in an earlier financial crisis.
Mendez recalled that when he assumed leadership, the company was warning that it might run out of cash before the end of 2025.
A recapitalization involving Series B preferred securities provided nearly $9 million in financing and addressed approximately $19 million in secured and unsecured debt, according to his account.
“We raised nearly $9 million,” Mendez said. “We got rid of the financial heartache of almost $19 million of secured and unsecured debt.”
The financing gave management additional time to execute its strategy, but the securities also contained conversion provisions that would become consequential when Safe Harbor implemented a reverse stock split.
Mendez explained that the company had hoped to raise additional capital through an equity line of credit and use those resources to expand lending.
Instead, he described several developments that undermined the plan, including the extended federal government shutdown, delays in cannabis rescheduling developments, and mounting pressure surrounding Nasdaq listing requirements.
Safe Harbor’s share price fell below $1, prompting the company to implement a reverse split intended to restore compliance.
According to Mendez, the Series B agreements contained a provision adjusting the conversion price following such a split, using a calculation tied to the lowest five-day volume-weighted average price over a specified 15-day period.
“We waited to the very last second to pull that trigger,” he said, explaining that management was concerned about the dilution that could follow.
The reverse split nevertheless went ahead.
Mendez said the Series B investors responded to the revised conversion terms by converting their preferred securities into common shares and selling them.
“They started converting and selling,” he said.
He characterized their decision as a response to an investment thesis that had not worked out as originally anticipated.
According to Mendez’s approximate recollection, outstanding common shares increased from roughly 1 million to about 164 million.
He cautioned that he was recalling the figures from memory. Safe Harbor’s regulatory filings documented 132,248,520 shares outstanding as of November 6 and 148,760,916 as of November 11.
The conversions dramatically reduced existing shareholders’ proportional ownership and added pressure to an already struggling stock.
Nasdaq Suspension and the Opifex Alternative
The reverse split ultimately failed to restore Safe Harbor’s compliance with Nasdaq requirements.
Mendez said the company’s share price subsequently fell below $0.10, triggering another listing problem.
He confirmed that Nasdaq had notified the company of a scheduled trading suspension on November 18.
“Our stock will likely trade on an OTC market post that November 18th,” he said.
The move could reduce visibility and trading liquidity.
“Obviously, the New York Stock Exchange, the Nasdaq and the like are highly visible. Lots of shareholders are on those platforms, and they command higher volumes.”
“Moving to the OTC presumably means a smaller market share of investors interested in buying those shares.”
Mendez also discussed the company’s proposed transaction with Opifex, which he described as an alternative restructuring strategy.
Under the arrangement he outlined, Safe Harbor’s holding company would own both its existing financial services business and Opifex, a creator-content company, bringing additional diversification and what he characterized as a larger balance sheet.
He described the potential trade-off for shareholders.
“Would a shareholder like to own, you know, 80% of Safe Harbor by itself, or would you like to own 15% of something bigger?”
According to Mendez, the proposed transaction would require resolving the outstanding Series B securities.
“They required that the Series B holders fully liquidate their shares, their warrants, everything, and really not be relevant post-acquisition of Opifex.”
Mendez said discussions concerning the transaction were continuing, although its completion remained uncertain.
He also acknowledged that management might need to offer further concessions to resolve the remaining preferred securities.
What Happens to Cannabis Banking Customers?
The financial uncertainty also raises questions for the cannabis operators and financial institutions that use Safe Harbor’s services.
Mendez emphasized that the company’s clients maintain their deposits with financial institutions rather than Safe Harbor itself.
He argued that the financial condition of the publicly traded company does not determine the safety of those deposits or change customers’ existing loan obligations.
He went further, describing what he believes would happen in the unlikely event that Safe Harbor ceased operating altogether.
“In the worst-case scenario, Safe Harbor disappears from the earth. Your bank account stays where your bank account is,” Mendez said.
“And you know, and your money is still yours, and the people that lent you money are still lending you that money, and nothing really changes.”
His comments reflect the distinction between Safe Harbor’s role as a service provider and the financial institutions that actually hold customer deposits and originate loans.
They do not guarantee uninterrupted access to every service, but they explain why the company’s corporate difficulties do not automatically translate into losses for banking customers.
Two Different Realities, One Company
Safe Harbor’s immediate future remains uncertain.
The company must address its Nasdaq listing difficulties, the remaining Series B obligations and the viability of its proposed restructuring.
Meanwhile, its cannabis banking business continues to serve financial institutions and operators that need compliance infrastructure, access to capital and specialized financial services.
Mendez believes the experience of Safe Harbor’s management team, including executives who have worked directly in cannabis operations, is a competitive advantage.
“We’re the only financial institution technology company that’s run by a former guy who was CEO of a multi-state operator and CEO of a single-state operator,” he said.
“Most of our leadership team and many of our bankers and lenders have spent time in the operations of a cannabis company.”
For shareholders, however, the company’s operating progress has yet to resolve the consequences of its financing arrangements.
That remains the central contradiction confronting Safe Harbor: a business reporting growing demand for its services, housed inside a public company whose stock faces suspension and whose ownership structure has been dramatically transformed.
“I’m excited about that,” Mendez said of the company’s operating performance. “I think the underlying business versus the incorporated public company, they’re just disconnected today.”
The disconnect between operating performance, access to capital and public-market valuations remains one of the defining challenges for the cannabis industry. These questions will be central to the conversation at IgniteIt’s Cannabis Capital & Policy Summit in Washington, D.C., on November 18, where industry executives, investors and policymakers will gather to discuss the financial and regulatory forces shaping the sector’s future.

